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KNOWLEDGE GOVERNANCE:  
MEANING, NATURE, ORIGINS, AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
Abstract 
Assumptions about the knowledge held by economic agents have been an integral part of 
the theory of economic organization since its inception. However, recent work—here 
called “knowledge governance”—has more explicitly highlighted knowledge as both an 
independent and dependent variable. Thus, a spate of work in management research and 
new institutional economics has highlighted dimensions such as complementarity, 
complexity, tacitness, and so on of knowledge assets and shown how knowledge assets, 
thus dimensionalized, has explanatory value with respect to economic organization. 
However, knowledge may also be seen as being caused by governance mechanisms and 
structures; specifically, incentives, allocations of decision rights, organizational structure 
and so on influence the search for knowledge, and the creation, sharing and integration of 
knowledge. More philosophically, the concern with the role of knowledge in the context 
of economic organization prompts a reevaluation of a number of the fundamental 
assumptions that are often used to guide theory-building in the economics of organization 
(e.g., Bayesian and game theoretical foundations).  
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INTRODUCTION 
Assumptions about the knowledge held by individuals have been an integral part of the economics 
of organization and governance since its inception. Thus, Knight (1921) tied the entrepreneur’s 
judgment concerning the use of scarce resources to meet highly uncertain future consumer demands 
closely to the existence of the business firm (cf. Foss & Klein, 2012, this volume), and Coase 
(1937) placed the epistemics of acting under uncertainty centrally in his analysis of firm 
organization (Langlois, 2007. The huge body of work in organizational economics that has been 
accumulating since the beginning of the 1970s has placed assumptions about how well agents 
individuals process knowledge (cognitive assumptions) and how they can gain access to knowledge 
(epistemic assumptions) (Goldman, 1978) center stage.
1
   
 Given the impressive pedigree of work that somehow links knowledge and economic 
organization, what sense can we make of the often voiced complaint that organizational economics 
theories somehow “neglect knowledge,” expressed with different force and in different ways by 
many economists and management scholars (Demsetz, 1988; Winter, 1988; Kogut & Zander, 1992; 
Grandori, 1997, 2001; Grandori & Kogut, 2002)? Moreover, in what sense is “knowledge 
governance” something distinctive? The overall purpose of this chapter is to answer these questions.  
 I shall specifically argue that it is only rather recently that organizational economists and 
organizational scholars have begun to systematically treat knowledge in a “thick” manner—
specifically, as something that is not just an additional constraint on the maximization problem, but 
can be subject to transacting, organizing and governing and which can be influenced in terms of its 
                                                          
1
 . For example, agency theory and its game theoretical foundations make several explicit, and often quite extreme, 
assumptions on these domains (e.g., shared common priors, common knowledge, specific assumptions about what 
exactly is asymmetric information) (Foss & Stea, 2011). Equilibrium outcomes in terms of contracting, levels of 
monitoring, and so on are crucially dependent on what exactly is assumed about knowledge in these models. More 
generally, asymmetric information, ignorance about future contingencies, and ambiguity concerning contract terms 
(“bounded rationality”) are invoked to explain imperfect and incomplete contracting, ownership patterns, and incentive 
design.  
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growth, change, composition, and so on by the deployment of governance structures (Williamson, 
1996) and mechanisms (Grandori, 1997). In fact, this is (one interpretation of) what is meant by 
“knowledge governance” (Foss, 2007). Thus, much of the impetus behind the recent interest in 
knowledge governance has emerged from the critique of organizational economics on the part of 
those who endorse the “knowledge-based view of the firm” (in its various incarnations). The critics 
argue that organizational economics tend to treat production knowledge as essentially homogenous 
across firms in an industry, flying in the face of a reality of differential capabilities. Echoing 
Richardson (1972), these writers argue this matter because differential capabilities are determinants 
of economic organization (notably the boundaries of the firm) on par with (or, perhaps even more 
important than) such determinants as asset specificity, frequency and uncertainty (e.g., Langlois, 
1992; Jacobides & Winter, 2005). As Argyres, Felin, Foss and Zenger (2011) note, a number of 
prominent organizational economists—including Holmström and Roberts (1998) and Williamson 
(1999)—have, somewhat surprisingly, accepted this argument. However, as Argyres et al. also note, 
the knowledge-based view gives complete explanatory primacy to capabilities, and fails to 
acknowledge that governance structures and mechanisms may antecede capabilities. In fact, a key 
explanatory purpose of knowledge governance may indeed be the explanation of heterogeneous 
firm-level capabilities.  I end by discussing this and other frontier issues, notably the inclusion of 
the governance of beliefs and cognitions in the knowledge governance project. 
WHY “KNOWLEDGE GOVERNANCE”?  
Origins 
 The origins of knowledge governance are manifold. In their Organization Science dialogue on 
the “knowledge and organization” nexus, Grandori and Kogut (2002) point to influences such as the 
growth of knowledge literature in the philosophy of science, the vast body of work on technology 
transfer, the organizational learning literature, and evolutionary economics. This pedigree supplies 
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the “knowledge” part. In terms of the “governance” part, knowledge governance is nourished by the 
fields of organizational design theory and organizational economics (Grandori, 2001a; Foss, 2007).  
 In a broader context, “knowledge” has been all the rage for more than a decade in a number of 
fields in management studies (e.g., Grandori & Kogut, 2002; Eisenhardt & Santos, 2003). Thus, a 
“knowledge movement” that cuts across traditionally separate disciplines in management research 
has emerged. The strategy field has a number of approaches that place (firm-level) knowledge (e.g., 
capabilities and competences) center stage (e.g., Grant, 1996; Spender, 1996; Kogut and Zander, 
1996); the international business field is in the process of developing a view of the multinational 
corporation as a knowledge-based entity (Tallman, 2003); network ideas that stress connections 
between knowledge nodes, often based on sociological notions of network ties (Granovetter, 1973), 
are becoming increasingly influential (Kogut, 2000; Ghoshal & Tsai, 1998; Tsai, 2001, 2002); and, 
of course, knowledge management has become not only a huge body of literature, but also a 
widespread organizational practice (Easterby-Smith and Lyles, 2003; Spender, 2005).  What unites 
these ideas is the notion that the management and governance of knowledge of whatever kind has 
become a critical issue for competitive dynamics, international strategy, the building of resources, 
the boundaries of firms, and many other issues.  
The Context: New Phenomena in Need of Explanation 
 The origin of knowledge governance as an emerging field may also be seen in the context of a  
number of new explananda for organizational research that became increasingly visible with the 
advent of a number of tendencies that are often summarized under the rubric of the “knowledge 
economy” (Foss, 2005). Among these tendencies is the increasing importance of human capital 
inputs, immaterial assets and scientific knowledge in production, the increasing importance of 
immaterial products, the need to control inhouse an increasing number of technologies (even if 
product portfolios are shrinking) (Brusoni, Prencipe & Pavitt 2001), and in general to tap an 
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increasing number of knowledge nodes, not just through internal but also through an increasing 
number of alliances and network relations with other firms as well as public research institutions 
(Doz et al. 2004). These tendencies are often seen as profoundly impacting economic organization 
and competitive advantages (Carmuffo, 2002; Ewing, 2002; Garicano & Rossi-Hansberg; 2003; 
Adler, 2001). However, the mechanisms through which this takes place are not always transparent, 
and part of what knowledge governance is up to may be understood as an attempt to theorize such 
mechanisms. 
 Much emphasis has been placed on the strongly growing importance of human capital as a 
driver of changes in economic organization (e.g., Rajan & Zingales, 2001). In management research 
the increasing importance of human capital has been reflected in notions of “knowledge workers” 
(Zuboff, 1988) and “knowledge-intensive firms” (Starbuck, 1992), that is, “… organizations staffed 
by a high proportion of highly qualified staff who trade in knowledge itself” (Blackler, 1995: 1022). 
According to a prominent argument, such firms may be differentiated from “traditional” firms in 
terms of organizational control by relying less on direction through the exercise of authority, 
eschewing high-powered performance incentives, and embracing “culture” and “clan” modes of 
organizational control. According to some this is more akin to a revolution than a gradual evolution; 
as Zingales (2000: 1641) argues: “… in 1994 a firm like Saatchi and Saatchi, with few physical 
assets and a lot of human capital, could have been considered an exception. Not anymore. The wave 
of initial public offerings of purely human capital firms, such as consultant firms, and even 
technology firms whose main assets are the key employees, is changing the very nature of the firm.” 
Virtually all of those who have written on the subject agree that tasks and activities in the 
knowledge economy need to be coordinated in a manner that is quite different from the 
management of traditional manufacturing activities. However, there is considerable divergence in 
the accounts of what exactly are the changed coordination requirements in the knowledge economy. 
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Thus, some argue that “traditional” coordination mechanisms such as price, authority, routines, 
standardization, etc. will diminish in relative importance, because knowledge-intensive production 
requires the increased use of mechanisms such as trust, communication, community, democratic 
procedures, etc. that can better cope with the particular metering problems and exchange hazards 
that are characteristic of knowledge transactions (e.g., Ghoshal, Moran & Almeida-Costa 1995). 
These scholars typically also argue that the increasing reliance upon cross-functional processes, 
extensive delayering, and empowerment reflect an aim is to create highly specialized and motivated 
units by means of extensive delegation of discretion. Cross-functional processes substitute for 
hierarchy in the coordination of tasks. Scholars promoting this view will tend to see the boundaries 
of firms blurring and employment relations undergoing dramatic change as a result of knowledge 
networks increasingly cutting across the boundaries of the firm and participative governance being 
increasingly adopted. Others take a more hard-nosed and less rosy view of the ongoing changes in 
economic organization. An important part of the tendencies constituting the knowledge economy 
are an intensification of competition as industry boundaries are eroded, and as internationalization 
and liberalization increase.  In response to such competitive pressures, as Adler (2001: 220) points 
out, “… firms are fine-tuning their management structures and planning processes, demanding 
greater accountability at every level, and enforcing more discipline in the planning and execution of 
operations.” As Zenger and Hesterly (1997) note, improved methods of cost allocation, more 
widespread use of IT and better measures of input and output performance have decreased the costs 
of monitoring employees and organizational units, in turn promoting a tendency to smaller 
organizational units that face more high-powered incentives.  
 With respect to the boundaries of the firm, many management scholars argue that trust-based 
(“community”-based) forms of organization emerge that can better handle “innovation tasks” 
(idem.). Others point out that “… the buffering functions of management are devolving to the 
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mechanisms of modularity and the market – informational decomposition, flexibility and risk 
spreading” (Langlois, 2003: 376). This does not necessarily imply that the boundaries of firms blur; 
rather, firms specialize and disintegrate. Also, while a modular system often internalizes 
knowledge-intensive transactions in modules, it is entirely consistent with innovative efforts 
(Langlois & Robertson, 1995). Thus, the information and knowledge richness associated with 
innovative efforts does not necessarily imply trust, rich information and knowledge transfer 
between firms, etc.   
 In sum, the emergence of the knowledge economy has given rise to a rich debate on the nature 
of the knowledge-based drivers of changing economic organization, as well as how economic 
organization influences knowledge processes. Theorizing the underlying mechanisms may be seen 
as the essence of knowledge governance.  
Meaning  
The term “knowledge governance” seems to have been first used by Grandori (2001). She 
offers a series of examples of “governance mechanisms” (a possible second terminological 
innovation) that support such processes as knowledge sharing and integration. Thus, decision rights, 
routines, rewards, modes of communication and so on are governance mechanisms that can be 
combined in multiple ways across governance structure and influence various knowledge-related 
processes via their effects on individuals’ knowledge sharing, creating, integrating, etc. behaviors. 
This conceptualization treats “knowledge” as a dependent variable, endogenous to governance. 
However, no explicit definition of knowledge governance (as a new field or a new construct) is 
proffered. In Grandori’s “dialogue on organization and knowledge” with Bruce Kogut, she 
(Grandori & Kogut, 2002: 225) explains that an important way in which knowledge approaches 
have contributed “… is in providing a new ‘contingency’ factor for understanding organizational 
arrangements, as well as to suggest new ways to conceive the nature of organizational 
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contingencies. Knowledge complexity, differentiation, specialization, complementarity, and 
interdependence are emerging as important contingencies affecting effective organization and 
governance solutions.” This treats knowledge (characteristics) as an independent variable, driving 
governance.  
There is, of course, nothing wrong in treating “knowledge” as both dependent and 
independent variables. Thus, some knowledge assets may effectively be thought of exogenous; for 
example, capabilities take time to change. Other aspects of knowledge may be thought of as 
endogenous, and partly influenced by exogenous knowledge variables; for example, outcomes of 
knowledge integration processes in a firm may be constrained (or facilitated) by the capabilities that 
are controlled by the firm. Moreover, in a dynamic analysis, one period’s exogenous variables may 
be taken to be next period’s endogenous variables. Thus, capabilities may be taken as exogenous in 
the short-run; however, they are obviously endogenous in the longer run.
2
  
Nevertheless, for heuristic purposes it makes sense to distinguish “knowledge governance 
with knowledge treated as an exogenous variable” and “knowledge governance with knowledge 
treated as an endogenous variable.” Given this, knowledge governance in the former sense may be 
defined as a sustained attempt to uncover how knowledge transactionswhich differ in their 
characteristicsand governance mechanismswhich differ with respect to how they handle 
transactional problems, are matched, using economic efficiency as the explanatory principle. This 
is how knowledge governance is explicitly defined in Foss (2007), and more implicitly in, for 
example, Silverman (1999) and Nickerson and Zenger (2004), all papers that take their primary 
cues from organizational economics (particularly transaction cost economics). However, much of 
the capabilities perspective as it applies to governance issues also adopts the “knowledge 
                                                          
2
 While organizational economics suggests that both “knowledge” (e.g., human capital investments) and “governance” 
(e.g., ownership patterns) are chosen simultaneously (as in Hart, 1995), and thus both are choice variables, the choice 
itself may still be constrained by pre-existing capabilities. For example, some human capital investments make sense, 
given the business that the firm is in, while others do not.  
9 
 
governance with knowledge treated as an exogenous variable” approach. Specifically, capabilities 
writers adopt a “capabilities first” heuristic according to which capabilities have explanatory 
primacy relative to governance considerations, and can, for the purposes of explaining economic 
organization (typically, the boundaries of the firm), be taken as exogenous (e.g., Kogut & Zander, 
1992; Madhok, 1996).  
We may also think of a knowledge governance approach in which “knowledge” is 
endogenous in the sense that the focus is on how governance structures and mechanisms influence 
knowledge-related behaviors, such as individual knowledge sharing, integration, creation, 
forgetting, and so on. Much management research in organizational theory, international business, 
strategic management, knowledge management and technology strategy has adopted such an 
approach (without calling it “knowledge governance”). Team theoretical work in organizational 
economics may also qualify as a knowledge governance approach in this sense, as the focus in team 
theory is on how the design of communication channels and the allocation of decision rights 
influence organizational outcomes, such as the rate of approval/rejection of innovation projects (i.e., 
knowledge creation) (Marschak & Radner, 1972; Sah & Stiglitz, 1985, 1986; Garicano, 2000). 
Economics work on human capital in labor economics and on entrepreneurship also has a bearing 
on knowledge governance (for details, see Foss & Mahnke, 2003).  
KNOWLEDGE GOVERNANCE WITH EXOGENOUS KNOWLEDGE 
Capabilities and Economic Organization  
While knowledge governance is positioned in the broad “knowledge movement” (Eisenhardt 
& Santos, 2003; see also Grandori & Kogut, 2002), in historical and substantive terms it owes much 
to the long-standing capabilities critique of organizational economics. Capabilities theorists forward 
that capabilities ideas hold the key to understanding organizational heterogeneity—a key issue in 
strategic management and other management research fields—while organizational economics is 
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largely silent about this issue. To the extent that such heterogeneity matters to economic 
organization—notably, the boundaries of the firm—the capabilities view therefore holds 
explanatory primacy.  
 The first contribution in the research literature to make use of the “capabilities” terminology 
in the context of understanding economic organization and make the above arguments is 
Richardson (1972). Drawing on Penrose (1959), Richardson (1972: 888) argues that explaining the 
“division of labour between firm and market” requires that we place the “elements of organisation, 
knowledge, experience and skills” center stage. In a footnote, he mentions Coase’s (1937) 
explanation of the boundary costs in terms of the relative costs of using firms versus markets as 
basic coordination modes, and adds that the “explanation that I have provided is not inconsistent 
with his but might be taken as giving content to the notion of this relative cost by specifying the 
factors that affect it” (Richardson, 1972: p.888n).3  
 Partly because capabilities idea did not catch on in management research and economics until 
the end of the 1980s, the discussion lay dormant for almost two decades. However, it was 
revitalized in 1988 in important contributions by Demsetz (1988) and Winter (1988). Both argued 
that the economics of the firm neglected firm-specific knowledge and how it shapes the boundaries 
of the firm. Later papers by Kogut and Zander (1992, 1996), Madhok (1996), Conner and Prahalad 
(1996) and others aggressively argued that economic organization was fully explainable in 
capabilities terms, and that no use need to be made of the notion of opportunism (or moral hazard, 
or misaligned incentives in general; for a critique of this position, see Foss, 1996a). This position 
seems to have been abandoned in favor of an argument that capabilities ideas and organizational 
economics are complementary in an additive manner. In such an understanding, for example, 
                                                          
3
 Unlike most subsequent research, Richardson explicitly dimensionalizes capabilities (in terms of the extent to which 
capabilities in adjacent stages of the value chain are “similar” and “complementary”) and argues that the resulting 
taxonomy has direct implications for the boundaries of the firm. Thus, he argues that similar and highly complementary 
capabilities should be organized by a firm, while dis-similar but highly complementary capabilities give rise to hybrid 
organizational forms, and dissimilar and complementary capabilities are best organized by the market). 
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capabilities theory informs us about which resources are need(to position in an industry and 
compete in certain ways, while organizational economics informs us about the optimal sourcing and 
organization of such resources. Such an understanding of the relation between the two perspectives 
is explicit or implicit in much work over the last decade or so (e.g., Argyres, 1996; Silverman, 
1999). It may have been given legitimacy among those who subscribe to organizational economics 
by the fact that Williamson (1999) seemed to endorse it. Arguments that stress the additive 
complementarity of different theories are often made in management research (e.g., Mahoney & 
Pandian, 1992). Note, however, that accepting the argument that complementarity obtains in an 
additive manner is implicitly a call for giving up theory development in the intersection of 
capabilities theory and organizational economics; in fact, it is a denial that there is a meaningful 
shared domain of application, because it implies that the relevant theories address different 
explanandum phenomena. Therefore, they are not theoretical rivals.  
Capabilities First! 
 However, some work has explored relations of complementarity that goes beyond the additive 
in greater detail. Such work recognizes that there is a meaningful zone of overlap between the 
capabilities view and organizational economics. In contrast to earlier contributions it is recognized 
that the theories are not rival, or additive, but that the variables identified in the different approaches 
may be seen as interacting in an essential manner. For example, Mayer and Argyres (2004) and 
Argyres and Mayer (2007) conceptualize transacting (i.e., contracting) as a learned capability. 
Learning in a contractual relation reduces transaction cost; as a result changes in contract terms can 
be observed that are not explainable in terms of changes in asset specificity but rather in terms of 
learning and capability. In early work that also stressed genuine complementarity, Langlois (1988, 
1992) argued that transaction costs may moderate the link from the capability distribution in an 
industry to vertical scope. Specifically, he argued that under dynamic conditions firms may not be 
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able to access the services they wish to access; suppliers may not understand what exactly is 
required of them. Such communication costs (Langlois calls them “dynamic transaction costs”) may 
drive boundary decisions in dynamic environments (see also Teece, 1977), while  the more 
conventional transaction costs of transaction cost economics drive boundary decisions in more static 
environments.
4
 In Langlois’ approach, capabilities are primary; transactions costs enter as a 
moderating force. Although written from a transaction cost perspective, the Mayer and Argyres 
paers also exemplify the dominance of capabilities: Their argument assumes that learning and 
capabilities drive governance, rather than the other way around 
The dominance of the “capabilities first!” heuristic is arguably caused by a prevalent 
conception that capabilities ideas remain our best shot at a theory of organizational heterogeneity 
and that they encapsulate heterogeneous resources, routines, coordination mechanisms, identity and 
so on. “Capabilities” is a much richer construct than, say, “asset specificity.” Organizational 
economics has typically not emphasized organizational heterogeneity, which has not traditionally 
been seen as either part of the explanans or the explanandum phenomena of organizational 
economics. Thus, there is little in, for example, Williamson (1996) or Hart (1995) that suggests why 
firm should be heterogeneous with respect to how they organize production and conduct 
transactions. Because the capabilities construct is first and foremost designed as an encapsulation of 
organizational heterogeneity, it has played essentially no role in mainstream organizational 
economics.  
Dimensionalizing Knowledge and Identifying Knowledge-related Exchange Hazards 
                                                          
4
 In a related later paper, Jacobides and Winter (2005) build a model of industry evolution that ostensibly studies the co-
evolution of firm capabilities and the costs of transacting and organizing. However, in spite of the announced co-
evolution of transaction costs and capabilities, in actuality capabilities have explanatory primacy in this paper—as 
indeed in the rest of the literature on capabilities and transaction costs. Thus, capabilities and learning directly influence 
transaction cost, rather than the other way around; while the capabilities view and organizational economics are both 
part of the same theoretical edifice, the foundation consists of capabilities ideas. 
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While arguments linking capabilities and economic organization have often been made in the 
management literature, the notion of “capability” is, however, a macro-construct that easily 
suppresses the fine grain of the mechanisms that link knowledge and economic organization.
5
 In 
contrast, the transaction, the contract or the individual agent are units that are more easily identified, 
dimensionalized and given to empirical measurement. Indeed, the absence of a clear unit of analysis 
has been highlighted as a source of confusion in the knowledge movement (Williamson, 1999). Is it 
routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982), or dynamic capabilities (Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997), or 
practices (Spender, 2005), or knowledge assets (Winter, 1987)?  
Disciplines, fields, or approaches are not necessarily characterized by unique units of analysis. 
Thus, the existing diversity when it comes to addressing knowledge in organizations may simply 
reflect that different research problems are involved. In general, what is the preferred unit of 
analysis should depend on the relevant research problems. The unit may thus differ depending on 
whether the focus is, for example, on knowledge sharing, integration or creation inside the firm, or 
how knowledge that, in some sense, resides on the firm-level impact firm boundaries. Knowledge 
governance issues are inherently multi-level and require multi-level theory and empirics. Moreover, 
the relevant units of analysis may differ, depending on the explanatory purpose at hand 
That being said, however, some units of analysis seem to be more generally applicable than 
other ones. Perhaps the most generally applicable unit of analysis for the kind of problems that 
knowledge governance seeks to solve is the knowledge transaction, that is, the transfer of an 
identifiable “piece” of knowledge from one actor to another one (Contractor & Ra, 2002). Most 
knowledge governance issues seem somehow reducible to this transactional level. This also holds 
for macro arguments that posit that the boundaries of the firm are shaped by the firm-level 
                                                          
5
 As Argote and Ingram (2000: 156) noted, to the extent that there has been progress in studying knowledge as the basis 
of competitive advantage, “… it has been at the level of identifying consistencies in organizations’ knowledge 
development paths and almost never at the level of human interactions that are the primary source of knowledge and 
knowledge transfer.” In contrast, organizational economics is unabashedly methodologically individualist, and therefore 
seek to highlight action and interaction in the explanation of governance. 
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idiosyncratic knowledge (e.g., Kogut & Zander, 1992), for such arguments implicitly appeal to 
mechanisms involving knowledge transfer that ultimately turn on individuals (e.g., Langlois, 1992).  
More generally, knowledge processes, such as knowledge sharing, integration, and creation, as 
reduceable to (sequences of) knowledge transactions.  
Taking the knowledge transaction as unit of analysis obviously has the added benefit of 
linking up with organizational economics and an established framework for linking transactions to 
alternative kinds of organizing. However, the way of dimensionalizing transactions that has become 
dominant in organizational economics, namely the transaction cost economics triad of 
frequency/uncertainty/asset specificity, seems incomplete for the purposes of dimensionalizing 
knowledge transactions (cf. also Grandori, 2001a; Heimann & Nickerson, 2002; Nickerson & 
Zenger, 2004). It is not clear how dimensionalizing a knowledge transaction in these terms assist 
the understanding of, for example, knowledge sharing where transactional problems may be caused 
more by the degree of codification of the relevant knowledge than its “uncertainty” (whatever that 
might mean in the specific context). The knowledge-based literature has not been very successful 
with respect to forwarding theoretically, dimensionalizations of knowledge.
6
 An exception is the 
Winter (1987) taxonomy, which has been the basis for much subsequent empirical work (e.g., 
Kogut & Zander, 1993; Simonin, 1999; Grandori & Kogut, 2002, and which presents the the 
dimensions of tacitness vs. explicitness, system-quality vs. stand-alone, teachability vs. non-
teachability, and complexity vs. non-complexity. Although these dimensions have usually been 
applied to more aggregate knowledge constructs (such as routines and capabilities) in the empirical 
literature, they may also be used to characterize knowledge transactions.  Other dimensions may be 
relevant. For example, scholars working from a transaction cost economics perspective have 
                                                          
6
 The many studies of inter-firm imitation and intra-firm knowledge transfer (e.g., Maritan & Brush 2003) tend to 
develop dimensions of, say, capabilities in an inductive manner and the explicit or implicit dimensionalizations differ 
from study to study. 
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suggested adding “appropriability” as a relevant dimension (e.g., Oxley, 1997), and Contractor and 
Ra (2002) suggest adding how “novel” the knowledge is (knowledge with a higher degree of 
novelty is more costly to contract, absorb, assimilate, integrate, etc.).  
In the context of knowledge governance, the import of dimensionalization the unit of analysis 
is that the costs of sharing, integrating, and creating knowledge vary systematically with the 
relevant dimensions, and that the deployment of governance mechanisms to curb such costs should 
take this into account. Thus, along the same lines of reasoning as in standard transaction cost 
economics, knowledge transactions give rise to organizational hazards and costs depending on how 
they score in terms of the above dimensions. For example, in the context of sharing knowledge, 
knowledge transactions that are characterized by [explicitness, stand-alone, high teachability, non-
complexity] are less costly to govern than knowledge transactions that score opposite on these 
characteristics. Transactions (in the context of knowledge sharing) that involve knowledge that is 
new, tacit, has significant system-quality, is hard to teach, etc. are associated with cost of 
transmitting the knowledge from sender to receiver, (measurement) costs of ascertaining the extent 
to which knowledge has been shared, (monitoring) costs of inspecting input performance, and other 
well known organizational costs. This treats governance as endogenous to knowledge 
characteristics. However, it also possible to consider the reverse causality.  
KNOWLEDGE GOVERNANCE WITH ENDOGENOUS KNOWLEDGE 
Governance Driving Knowledge: The Economics of the Firm 
Williamson (1985) admits that transaction cost economics “freezes” technology, at least as a 
heuristic starting point. This would seem to rule out the possibility that governance can antecede 
knowledge in the sense that the choice of governance structures and the deployment of governance 
mechanisms within those structures influence the amount, type, quality and so on of the knowledge 
that is shared, integrated, created, etc. However, one should not confuse heuristic assumptions with 
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substantive theory. In fact, classical organizational economics has right from the beginning 
identifiied many theoretical mechanisms that have the potential to link governance and knowledge 
(although, as we shall see, that potential has mainly been realized in management research). 
Thus, Alchian and Demsetz (1972) argued that a key purpose of the “specialized surrogate 
market” of the firm is to gain superior (relative to other firms) knowledge about productivities, and 
the efficient matching of employees and activities. Thus, the existence of the firm is directly linked 
to the ability to gain and deploy superior knowledge. A similar argument can be derived from 
Williamson, Wachter and Harris’ (1975) point that an advantage of intrafirm labor allocation is that 
it can take advantage of costly to communicate rating information. Alchian (1984) stressed the 
relational rents stemming from improved information gained by repeated association. Such rents 
rooted in superior knowledge may give rise to opportunistic haggling that is best controlled within 
the firm.Sah and Stiglitz (1985) explained how organizational structures may be conceptualized as 
structures for evaluating projects, and different structures will yield different evaluation outcomes. 
Thus, the knowledge-related activity of evaluating, for example, innovation projects, is directly 
linked to internal organization. Jensen and Meckling (1992) examine how delegation of decision 
rights influence the utilization of locally held knowledge, which places knowledge utilization 
centerstage. Many papers in agency theory have explicitly linked organizational practices, such as 
the up-or-out mechanism, to human capital accumulation (Prendergast, 1993).   
A compact way of understanding “governance” is that it is the formal and informal allocation 
of decision (or property) rights and the mechanisms that enforce such rights (Jones, 1983). This 
rights allocation and the accompanying enforcement mechanisms constitute the distribution of 
authority, the attributes of governance mechanisms, organizational structure, and other aspects of 
formal organization, but clearly also relates to, for example, social ties and networks inside firms. 
An allocation of property rights is also an allocation of incentives (Barzel, 1997), including 
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incentives to search for knowledge, share knowledge, accumulate human capital, leverage 
knowledge capital, etc. Moreover, property rights influence bargaining powers (Hart, 1995). Thus, 
the allocation of property rights, both in terms of overall governance structures (i.e., the allocation 
of ownership rights) and the governance mechanisms inside those structures (which specify the 
allocation of, e.g., decision rights), would be expected to influence knowledge processes. For 
example, the specification of income rights in a governance structure directly influence how much 
each participating individual appropriates of the value created by interaction in the relevant 
governance structure. Appropriation matters to knowledge processes, for example, because 
employee incentives to search for, share, create, and integrate knowledge are influenced by how 
much they can appropriate.
7
   
Thus, several theoretical mechanisms link governance and knowledge. It is true that 
organizational economics has refrained from making the issue of why such mechanisms should 
work differently in different firms a major issue (in this sense, the capabilities critique is valid). 
However, it is not at variance with organizational economics to posit that managers face different 
constraints, or have different utility functions, and will therefore make different choices. Neither is 
it inconsistent with organizational economics to posit that such choices are path-dependent 
(Williamson, 1996; Argyres & Liebeskind, 1999).  Thus, the mainstream economics of the firm has 
a huge potential to effectively deal with knowledge governance issues. However, so far rather few 
organizational economists have risen to the challenge (but see, e.g., Garicano, 2000).  
Governance Driving Knowledge: Beyond the Mainstream Economics of the Firm 
In contrast, the exploration of knowledge governance has been thriving in management 
research. Thus, different branches of management research provides examples of work in the  
                                                          
7
 For example, social ties and networks are important for understanding the links between knowledge and superior 
returns, not just because of their potentially beneficial effects on returns, but also because such ties and networks grant 
legitimacy to the claims that employees may make on rents (Coff & Blyler, 2003).  
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“governance driving knowledge” vein—such as work relating to how multinational corporations 
leverage human resource management systems to promote knowledge transfer between subsidiaries 
(cf. Minbaeva et al., 2003); research into how governance mechanisms are deployed to knowledge-
based strategic alliances (Mowery et al., 1996; Oxley, 1997; Heimeriks & Duyster, 2006); work on 
the governance of human capital-intensive organizations (Child & McGrath, 2001; Teece, 2003);  
the organizational antecedents to the absorption of knowledge held by outside stakeholders (Janssen 
et al., 2006; Foss, Laursen & Pedersen, 2011); the link between control of knowledge assets and the 
appropriation of surplus from relations (Coff, 1999; Coff & Blyler, 2003); the provision of rewards 
to knowledge workers (Osterloh & Frey, 2000; Reinholt, Pedersen & Foss, 2012); and the impact of 
job design and communication on the motivation to share knowledge (Foss, Minbaeva, Reinholt & 
Pedersen, 2009).  This research stream took off at the end of the 1990s, as the emerging knowledge 
movement in management research made contacts with scholars who worked on organizational 
structure, design and HR issues, often from a partly economics-based perspective.  
Thus, in an early and influential paper Osterloh and Frey (2000) examine how knowledge 
transfer is influenced by organizational design. They identify a number of exchange hazards that 
beset internal knowledge transactions, argue that the transfer of tacit knowledge cannot be 
accomplished by contracting, and point out that it is difficult to sanction employees for holding 
back tacit knowledge. Therefore, the management of individual motivation becomes central. Firms 
have access to mechanisms (that markets don’t) to manage intrinsic motivation, such as 
participation which signifies agreement on common goals and raises employees’ self-determination, 
thereby strengthening intrinsic motivation and personal relationships. In turn, this allows for 
establishing psychological contracts based on emotional loyalties, which in turn raise the intrinsic 
motivation to cooperate. In contrast, too heavy-handed use of market-like incentives may crowd-out 
intrinsic motivation. This paper is one of the first of an increasing number of papers that link 
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governance and knowledge processes in an explicit multi-level argument through the mediating 
effect of employee motivation (e.g., Gottschalg & Zollo, 2007; Minbeava et al., 2003; Foss, 
Minbaeva, Pedersen & Reinholdt, 2009).  
Nickerson and Zenger (2004) seek to combine transaction cost economics and complexity 
theory (Simon, 1962; Kauffman, 1995) in the explanation of how alternative organizational forms 
influence the efficient production of valuable knowledge. The unit of analysis for knowledge 
generation is a specific problem, whose value is determined by the values in the array of possible 
solutions and the cost of discovering a particularly valuable problem. The solution to complex 
problems is assumed to represent unique combinations or syntheses of existing knowledge. 
Problems differ according to their decomposability. Decomposable problems involve limited 
interaction, whereas non-decomposable problems involve extensive interaction. This has important 
implications for the type of searching for a solution. Non-decomposable problems require 
individuals to share their specialized knowledge, which raises knowledge-related exchange hazards. 
Three distinct governance structures and their suitability for problems with differing characteristics 
are examined: markets, authority-based hierarchies and consensus-based hierarchies. Briefly, 
markets are ideally suited when problems are decomposable and directional search is desired; 
consensus-based hierarchy creates high organizational costs and should only be adopted when the 
benefits for consensus are high, which is for problems that are highly complex and non-
decomposable; finally, authority-based hierarchy is superior to markets in supporting heuristic 
search, but inferior in supporting directional search. The authors propose that authority based-
hierarchies are best suitable for a range of problems that are moderately complex.  
Nickerson and Zenger (2004) reasoning is an ingenious adaptation of fairly standard 
transaction cost economics. As such it relies on the notion of “discrete structural alternatives” (i.e., 
the three Williamsonian governance structures). In contrast, Grandori (1997, 2001a) analyzes the 
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various kinds of governance mechanisms that govern the transfer, sharing and integration of 
knowledge between and within firms. She concludes that the portfolio of mechanisms that are 
effectively employable between firms to link nodes of specialized knowledge can hardly be 
distinguished from those mechanisms employable within firms. An implication of her discussion is 
a denial of the strong emphasis on discrete governance structures in transaction cost economics. 
This is exactly contrary to the thrust of the Nickerson and Zenger (2004) discussion which builds 
off the Williamsonian emphasis on discrete governance structures that embody fixed constellations 
of governance mechanisms. Through a series of practical examples of knowledge governance, 
Grandori argues that various kinds of governance mechanisms are typically not specific to 
governance structures.
8
  
One future development path for knowledge governance lies in opting for higher micro-
specificity than is contained in the notion of governance structure. Governance structures can 
indeed contain different kinds of governing mechanisms in ways that may differ significantly across 
different manifestations of the “same” structure. This also means that it is hard to make clear 
prediction regarding how exactly governance structures drive knowledge processes. A more fine-
grained approach is to explore the various ways in which governance mechanisms combine to drive 
knowledge processes and what are the relations of complementarity and substitutability between 
governance mechanisms in this process. Such an undertaking will call on the skills and insights of 
organizational behaviour and human resource management scholars.  
THE FURTHER REACHES OF KNOWLEDGE GOVERNANCE: DEALING WITH 
BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND ITS RAMIFICATIONS 
Epistemic and Cognitive Assumptions in Organizational Economics 
                                                          
8
 The extent to which this is a critical point against, for example, transaction cost economics is open to debate. See, for 
example, Anderson and Gatignon (1986) for the same point, but made from the perspective of transaction cost 
economics.  
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The conjecture that animates knowledge governance is that it is possible to bring knowledge 
considerations into the corpus of established organizational economics and organizational design in 
a “thick” manner, in the sense of dealing substantially with phenomena like tacit knowledge, 
differential capabilities and learning—phenomena that are not easily aligned with the standard 
economics paradigm of asymmetric and imperfect information.  
 However, such integration takes place on several levels. One is the level of empirical 
research where such integrative efforts may be a matter of throwing a couple of knowledge-related 
variables into otherwise entirely standard designs derived from, say, transaction cost economics. 
Another one is the level of theoretical inquiry. Here the situation is quite different. It is arguable 
that a concern with the role of knowledge in the context of economic organization may necessitate a 
reevaluation of a number of the fundamental assumptions that are often used to guide theory-
building in the economics of organization (e.g., Bayesian and game theoretical foundations).  
Organizational economics make strong assumptions about the cognitive powers of agents. 
Like virtually all of formal, mainstream economics, it assumes cognitive homogeneity, correctness, 
and constancy: agents hold the same, correct, model of the world, and that model does not change. 
These assumptions are built into formal contract theory (i.e., agency theory and property rights 
theory) through the assumption that payoffs, strategies, the structure of the game, and so on are 
common knowledge. Bounded rationality is occasionally invoked as a necessary part of the theory 
of the firm, particularly by Williamson (1985, 1996); but most of the contracting problems studied 
in the modern theory of the firm require only asymmetric information (Hart, 1990). Indeed, 
bounded rationality seems to serve little function beyond justifying the assumption that contracts 
are incomplete (Foss, 2001). Likewise, because of the Bayesian underpinning of game-theoretic 
contract theory, Knightian uncertainty, or any notion of open-endedness or indeterminacy, has no 
role to play.  
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Because of these epistemic and cognitive assumptions, there is little or no role for governing 
knowledge in the wider sense of the governance of cognitive representations, including defining 
heuristics for dealing with Knightian uncertainty (Grandori, 2001b; 2011; Hatchuel, 2011). 
However, as Phelps (2006: 13) observes: 
work on contracts has posited, explicitly or implicitly, that the parties to a contract 
share identical “rational expectations,” since they have the identical model of the 
world. Work in that vein does not fit in a theory of capitalist economies, in which 
views are never homogenous and may be wildly diverse.  
Demsetz (1988) argues that organizational economics suffers from a fundamental asymmetry: 
knowledge for the purpose of decision-making is assumed to be scarce (as in agency models with 
their reliance on asymmetric information), while knowledge for the purpose of production is free. 
Demsetz argues that taking scarce production knowledge into account implies a different theory of 
firm boundaries (roughly akin to what was discussed above as the capabilities view).  However, the 
problem is deeper than Demsetz posits: Standard theories assume that knowledge may be costly, but 
decision-making is free in the sense that, equipped with sufficient knowledge, decision-makers can 
always compute an optimal solution to any decision problem. This is also reflected in the idea that  
differences in beliefs among individuals can be completely explained by differences in information 
and that individuals are not only (fully) rational in the sense of being capable of maximizing 
expected utility, but also ascribes such rationality to others These tenets are contradicted by the 
notion of bounded rationality and its various ramifications.  
Bounded Rationality and Economic Organization 
 An important aspect of knowledge in the context of economic organization is bounded 
rationality, which not only speaks to the efficiency with which decision-makers process knowledge 
(Marschak & Radner, 1972; Garicano, 2000), but also to issues of cognitive representations in 
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complex and uncertain environments (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000; Grandori, 2001b; Hatchuel, 
2001).  Furubotn (2001: 136) explains that 
[g]iven the cognitive restrictions that constrain each individual and the costly nature 
of information, a decision maker can have only partial knowledge of the full range 
of options known to the society as a whole. He can no longer be assumed to know 
everything about existing technological alternatives, the characteristics and 
availability of all productive inputs, the existence and true properties of every 
commodity in the system, etc. 
In the context of the theory of the firm, we cannot reduce the relevant decision problem to 
combining known inputs into known outputs in a transaction cost minimizing manner. If decision-
makers know only a small subset of the many possible input combinations and cannot perfectly 
foresee future preferences, “the individual devising the firm’s policies has to act as a true 
entrepreneur rather than as a manager routinely implementing clear-cut marginal rules for 
allocation.” (Furubotn, 2001: 139). The formation of cognitive representation in the form of setting 
direction, defining missions and so on becomes crucial, as does making sure that a process of 
organizational learning takes place within this cognitive framework (Witt, 1998). Entrepreneurs 
also form cognitive representations about which assets they need to secure the services from, the 
major contractual hazards associated with such procurement, and the most effective ways of 
protecting against such hazards. This suggests that the same transaction might be governed very 
differently, as human agents may hold heterogeneous cognitive representations (see Argyres & 
Liebeskind, 1999; Furubotn, 2002; Mayer & Argyres, 2004).  
Many proponents of bounded rationality have tended to model economic actors as hard-wired 
to choose certain courses of actions: “behavioralists tend to assume that agents are (1) hard-headed 
rule followers or (2) pre-programmed satisficers ab ovo” (Langlois & Csontos, 1993: 118). Others 
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have argued that Knightian uncertainty also has the effect of turning decision-makers into “hard-
headed rule folloers” (e.g., Heiner, 1983). However, as Foss and Klein (this volume) argue, building 
on Knight (1921) and Mises (1949), there is a more positive side to bounded rationality and 
uncertainty, namely the formation of judgment. Judgment represents a novel conjecture regarding 
the use of resources for servicing preferences, resides in the head of an entrepreneur (or in the heads 
of the members of an entrepreneurial team), is difficult to communicate, and so on. This creates 
barriers to exchange, and to capture profit from his judgment the entrepreneur must deploy it in the 
context of his own venture, and hire employees who can work based on their derived judgment.  
Governing Cognitions 
Whereas the link in the Knightian story is from judgment to governance, governance also 
influences cognitions. Thus, Lindenberg (2003; see also Grandori [1997] and Lindenberg & Foss, 
2011) argues that the governance of motivation—for example, to share, create, integrate, etc. 
knowledge—is first and foremost the governance of cognition. 
Lindenberg’s argument fundamentally derives from bounded rationality, because with 
standard assumptions on cognition, there is fundamentally nothing to “govern” as individuals are 
cognitive alike. He applies the insight from (social) cognition research that mental constructs have 
to activated in order to affect behavior, and that goals are particularly important mental constructs in 
which cognitions and motivations are intricately intertwined (e.g., Kruglanski & Köpetz, 2009), in 
the construction of a theory of “goal-framing.”  Briefly, overarching goals combine cognitive and 
motivational elements. When they are focal (i.e., when they are activated at the moment), such 
goals “frame” a situation by steering important cognitive processes in the service of the focal goal, a 
process in which motivation expresses itself though cognitions. More concretely, goals (and 
especially overarching goals) govern what we attend to; what concepts and chunks of knowledge 
are being activated; what alternatives we consider; what information we are most sensitive about; 
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and how we process information (Lindenberg & Foss, 2011). For example, goals may be directed 
towards what is “appropriate” (the normative goal frame). Or, they may have hedonic orientations 
(the hedonic goal frame) or be oriented towards personal gain (the gain goal frame). Cues in the 
environment can drastically affect goals, thereby creating shifts in cognitions and motivations and 
the way they interact. Governance structures would have to be specifically constructed to deal with 
this interaction because it creates constraints on virtually all governance mechanisms.  
Lindenberg and Foss (2011) systematically address how governance mechanisms affect 
goals. For example, they argue that authority structures that stress fiat or control rights as basis for 
the legitimacy of orders and instructions are likely to weaken the normative goal-frame in favor of a 
gain or hedonic goal-frame, and that group rewards that emphasize the contribution to common 
goals on a higher organizational level than the group itself support a normative goal-frame. 
Although this perspective is framed as a general one, applicable to all forms of organization, it is 
arguable that it is particularly applicable to the understanding of knowledge governance in 
organizations. The governance of knowledge raises distinct motivational, incentive and 
coordination problems in organizations, because of the difficulties of defining well-defined 
performance measures for knowledge sharing, integration, creation, and so on, and because of the 
importance of stimulating not just autonomously motivated behaviors, but, more specifically, 
behaviors that are intrinsically motivated (and thus conducive to creativity and learning) and 
socially motivated (and thus conducive to knowledge sharing efforts).  
The goal framing perspective address different kinds of motivation, deriving from different 
cognitions, that are all in different ways important to knowledge governance. In particular, the 
perspective recognizes that undertaking different kinds of knowledge-related efforts require 
different motivations, and therefore different governance instruments. Thus, creative, knowledge-
creating behaviors may require a dominance of hedonic goal-frames are associated with intrinsic 
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motivations, while the sharing of knowledge may require the dominance of the normative goal 
frame that is more strongly associated with pro-social motivations. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter I have provided characterization of the emerging field of knowledge, differentiating 
between two knowledge governance streams: A stream that endogenizes knowledge and identifies 
governance structures and mechanisms as relevant antecedents, and a stream that reverses this 
causality. The former stream owes much to certain currents in the theory of the firm, notably team 
theory and transaction cost economics, and to contributions to management research in 
organization, strategic alliances, product development and international business. The latter stream 
owes more to the capabilities view of the firm. This interpretation and account complements earlier 
accounts of knowledge governance, notably Grandori and Kogut (2002) and Foss (2007).  To 
progress, however, the knowledge governance view needs to go beyond the notions of agency, 
motivation and cognition associated with its source theory. In particular, knowledge governance 
ultimately means more than the efficient organization of knowledge-related transactions, activities 
or behaviours: It also means governing the cognitions of individuals, and therefore the knowledge 
that is pragmatically applied to make sense out of situations and what should properly be done in 
those situations.  Although the knowledge governance approach has historically developed from the 
economic theory of the firm, organizational design perspectives, the capabilities view, and 
knowledge management, in the future knowledge governance will benefit from closer liaisons with 
cognitive science and the micro organizational behaviour literature.  
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